Gratz et al. v Bollinger et al.

Gratz et al. v Bollinger et al. (2003)

FACTS:
Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, both Caucasian Michigan residents, applied for admission to the University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the Arts. Gratz applied and was denied in 1995, and subsequently enrolled at the University of Michigan at Dearborn (graduating in 1999). Hamacher applied and was denied in 1997, and he enrolled at the Michigan State University (graduating in 2001). During Gratz’s application year, the University considered many factors including GPA and ACT/SAT scores to place applicant on an admit/reject/delay/postpone table; applicants’ admission outcomes were based upon their racial or ethnic status. During Hamacher’s application year, the University modified the system, explicitly placing even further emphasis on minority status by increasing his or her qualification score. Starting 1998, the University replaced the system with a 150 point scale system, allowing 20 points to all applicants of an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group. Applicants filed in the Eastern District of Michigan’s U.S. District Court for compensatory and punitive damages for past violations, declaratory relief, an injunction prohibiting the University from continuing to discriminate on the basis of race, and an order requiring the LSA to offer Hamacher admission as a transfer student. The District Court granted summary judgment to applicants with respect to the admission policies from 1995 to 1998, summary judgment to respondents with respect to the policies from 1999 to 2000, and denied applicants injunctive relief.

ISSUE:
Do petitioners have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief? (Yes)
Do the University’s policies violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment (and therefore also Title VI) by failing strict scrutiny? (Yes)

REASONING:
(Rehnquist)
While considering the facts, the Court has determined that the “injury in fact” in an equal protection case is the denial of equal treatment itself, not the ultimate inability to obtain a benefit if the inequality had not existed. In this specific instance, the “’injury in fact’ is the inability to compete on an equal footing” in the application process, not the loss of an admittance. By demonstrating he was “able and ready” to apply as a transfer student when the University ceases its application of race in admissions, Hamacher has standing to seek prospective relief. The Court then considered whether Hamacher may act as the class representative in a class action suit; the District Court allowed the class, determining it satisfied the requirements of numerosity, commonality, and typicality. The Court agreed, furthering that it is important to treat the case as a class because if kept individual, each claim risks becoming moot.

The Court continues and rejects the applicant’s initial argument of a 14th Amendment violation because diversity is too open-ended to constitute a compelling interest capable of surviving strict scrutiny on the rationale set forth in Grutter v Bollinger. The Court rejects the respondent’s reply (the ability for the University to individually consider applicants, thereby fulfilling Justice Powell’s intent in Bakke) to petitioner’s claim (that the current policy is not “narrowly tailored to achieve” a compelling state interest). The Court argues that the automatic distribution of 20 points to applicants of the outlined minority groups has the effect of making “the factor of race decisive”, whereas Justice Powell’s example in Bakke explicitly states race can be considered without being decisive. The University’s “individualized review” is not sufficient in this instance, because it is applied only after the automatic distribution of 20 points, thereby making race a decisive factor in nearly every minority application.

The Court also considers respondent’s contention that the large volume of applications precludes individualized consideration, and rejects administrative inconvenience as an excuse to utilize an unconstitutional system.

CONCURRING:
(O’Connor)
Justice O’Connor emphasizes the point that the 20 point bonus is massive in relative comparison to the other “soft variables” the University considers. Also, Justice O’Connor argues the Admissions Review Committee, the only party able to provide an individualized review, can be considered an afterthought to the process instead of integral. The system is “a non-individualized, mechanical one”.

(Thomas)
Justice Thomas holds that the use of racial discrimination is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, and that the University’s policies as they exist do not allow for the “consideration of nonracial distinctions among underrepresented minority applicants”.

(Breyer)
Justice Breyer concurs with the Court’s reversal of the District Court’s decision, but dissents with the court’s opinion. Justice Breyer concurs with Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in that policies of inclusion and exclusion are different, and inclusive policies are more likely to further individual equality.

DISSENTING:
(Stevens, Souter)
Justice Stevens believes that the petitioners would not receive any benefit from prospective relief because neither are applying as freshmen, and without personal stake in the suit, neither have standing. Additionally, the petitioners’ cannot demonstrate imminent threat of future injury, and so they cannot seek injunctive relief. Because Hamacher did not actually apply as a transfer student at the time of the initial suit, Justice Stevens contends his claim of future injury is “conjectural or hypothetical” rather than “real and immediate”. Neither is there any mention of the transfer student application policy at the District Court level; only the freshman policy was considered, and thusly “Hamacher cannot base his right to complain about the freshman admissions policy on his hypothetical injury under a wholly separate transfer policy”. Even further, Justice Stevens hypothesizes that ordering the University to change freshmen admission policies would not affect the transfer policy. Justice Stevens also claims the applicants lack Article III standing, as either representative fulfills the personal-stake requirement.

(Souter, Ginsburg)
Justice Souter dissents with both the applicants’ holding, and the Court’s judgment on the case’s merits. Justice Souter argues that the “petitioners did not raise a narrow tailoring challenge to the transfer policy”, and Hamacher does not have standing to challenge the freshmen admissions policy. Additionally, Justice Souter reinforces that the system as it stands is not a quota system as struck down in Bakke; if anything, the policy is word-for-word in compliance with the Bakke decision in that “all pertinent elements of diversity” are considered, although not in the same weight (this is allowed by Bakke as well). Souter claims that all the other aspects considered in admissions are given a stated numeric value of “points”, so assigning points for minority status is in keeping with that system. Also, the applicants did not convincingly show that the University guarantees every minority applicants a higher ranking than non-minority applicants, and so the 20 points does not become a decisive factor. Regardless, because the Court was given no information about the Admissions Review Committee, Souter claims the Court cannot judge the entire admissions process based on the point system.

(Ginsburg, Souter)
Justice Ginsburg begins by stating our society has just recently passed an age of oppressive discrimination, and that a distinction should be considered between policies of exclusion and inclusion (but recognizes that any race-conscious measure merits careful inspection). Ginsburg contends that because the University has a large applicant pool with only few admitted slots, and that the number of “white applicants greatly outnumber minority applicants”, that any sort of preference for minority applicants, including the point system, will not drastically diminish the odds for a white applicant’s admission. For Ginsburg, it is necessary to proactively increase the enrollment of minority students in order to combat the racial oppression still in our society, and it is better to explicitly grant preference to minorities in the application rather than insinuating it through other disguises.

HOLDING:
The automatic distribution of points based on minority status in a point-based admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity, which the Court has found to be a compelling state interest. Applicants must be considered as individuals; each applicant’s racial or ethnic background contributes to the individual, and it must be the individual, not the racial category, which must be considered during application review, regardless of administrative inconvenience. By making race a decisive factor for virtually every minority applicant, the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, as well as Title VI and 42 U.S.C. §1981.